Linguistic intuitions in context: a defense of nonskeptical pure invariantism. by Turri, John




He either knows for certain, or he  
heard from the right people. I will  
ask him. And he will tell me.
— Batman1
Epistemic  invariantism  is  the  view  that  the  truth  conditions  of 
knowledge ascriptions don’t vary across contexts. Epistemic purism 
is  the  view  that  purely  practical  factors  can’t  directly  affect  the 
strength of your epistemic position. The combination of purism and 
invariantism, pure invariantism, is the received view in contempor-
ary epistemology. It has lately been criticized by contextualists, who 
deny invariantism, and  by  impurists, who deny purism. A central 
charge against  pure invariantism is  that  it  poorly  accommodates 
linguistic intuitions about certain cases.  In this paper I develop a 
new response to this charge. I propose that pure invariantists can 
explain the relevant linguistic intuitions on the grounds that they 
track the propriety of indirect speech acts, in particular indirect re-
* This is  the penultimate version of a paper forthcoming in  Intuitions,  ed. 
Anthony Booth and Darrell Rowbottom (OUP).  Please cite the final, pub-
lished version if possible.
1 Batman:  As  the  Crow  Flies,  http://www.otd.com/~paul/Quote/bat-
man.html.
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quests and denials. In the process we learn an important methodo-
logical lesson about how to effectively marshal linguistic intuitions 
in favor of — or in opposition to — a theory.
First I will explain pure invariantism and its rivals, contextual-
ism and impurism (section 1). Then I will present a central argu-
ment against pure invariantism (section 2). Next I will review some 
previous responses to the argument (section 3). Lastly I will develop 
a new response (sections 4 and 5) and conclude with a methodolo-
gical lesson (section 6).
1. The received view explained
One of the liveliest philosophical debates over the past two decades 
concerns the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. Competing views 
here divide into two camps: contextualist and invariantist.
Contextualists  claim  that  the  truth  conditions  of  knowledge 
ascriptions, such as ‘I know that P’ or ‘He doesn’t know that P’, vary 
with features of the speaker’s context.2 The hallmark of contextual-
ism — “the result that contextualists insist on” (DeRose 2009: 61) — 
is that a speaker in one context could truly say ‘S knows that P’,  
while simultaneously a speaker in a different context could refer to 
the same person at the same time with respect to the same proposi-
tion, and truly say ‘S doesn’t know that P’. It is possible that some 
such disagreements are merely verbal, contextualists say, because 
the speaker’s context determines how strong an epistemic position 
2 A quick note on quotation: I use single quotes to mention or name expres-
sions; I use double quotes as scare quotes and for direct quotation.
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S must be in with respect to P in order for the speaker to speak 
truthfully by saying ‘S knows that P’. Consequently, S might meet 
the laxer requirements selected by the one speaker’s context but fail 
to  meet the stricter requirements selected by the other speaker’s 
context, and this is why they could both speak truthfully.
Invariantists  deny  the  hallmark  of  contextualism.  The  truth-
conditions of knowledge ascriptions, according to invariantism, are 
insensitive to features of the speaker’s context. Every context selects 
the same requirements for being in a strong enough epistemic posi-
tion for knowledge. No matter how different our respective contexts 
are, if you say ‘S knows that P’, and I say ‘S doesn’t know that P’, 
and we’re simultaneously referring to the same person by ‘S’ and 
the same proposition by ‘P’, then our disagreement is  not merely 
verbal. At least one of us speaks falsely.
A second debate has emerged over the past decade, which cuts 
across  the  contextualism/invariantism  debate.  It  concerns  the 
nature  of  knowledge  itself,  in  particular  how it  relates  to  purely 
practical matters. Suppose that Naomi and David both have a true 
belief that P, that they both base their belief on equally good and 
compelling evidence, that they are equally reliable on the question 
at hand, that they are equally alert to counterevidence, and so on. In 
short, on all relevant truth-related matters, Naomi and David are 
equal. In virtue of this, let’s say that they’re in an  equally strong 
epistemic position relative to P. Given that they both have a true be-
lief and are in an equally strong epistemic position, could it never-
theless turn out that only one of them knows P? Could it turn out 
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that,  say,  Naomi  knows  P,  but  David  doesn’t?  Could  a  purely 
nonepistemic (i.e. a “practical”) feature of David’s situation prevent 
him from knowing P? For example, if David has more at stake than 
Naomi does on whether P is true, and holding all else equal, could 
that prevent David from knowing P? Purists answer ‘no’. Impurists 
answer ‘yes’.3  The hallmark of impurism is that “what makes a true 
belief into knowledge is not entirely an epistemic matter” (Stanley 
2005: 2).
Leading contextualists endorse purism.4 By contrast, a debate 
rages between purists and impurists in the invariantist camp. Im-
pure invariantists claim that although the truth-conditions of know-
ledge attributions are not sensitive to the speaker’s context,  they 
nevertheless are sensitive to practical features of the context of the 
subject under evaluation (i.e. the S in ‘S knows that P’). Pure invari-
antists deny  both that the truth-conditions of knowledge attribu-
tions  vary  with  the  speaker’s  context  and that  they  vary  with 
changes in the practical features of the subject’s context.5
3 ‘Purism’ is Fantl and McGrath’s (2009) term. It is also called “intellectual-
ism” (Stanely 2005, DeRose 2009). Impurism is also called “practicalism” 
(Grimm 2011) and “pragmatic encroachment” (Jon Kvanvig’s coinage).
4 DeRose (2009: 188 n. 4, 189) remarks, “One of the intuitive attractions of 
contextualism is that it allows one to uphold intellectualism [i.e. purism] 
while delivering certain desired results about key test cases,” and that his 
“allegiance to intellectualism” has motivated his sustained defense of con-
textualism. See also Cohen 2005. However, Fantl and McGrath (2009: 35–
6) point out that there might be hints of impurism in Lewis’s (1996) de-
fense of contextualism. Fantl and McGrath even express some sympathy 
for impure contextualism (see also McGrath 2010: §6).
5 Williamson (2005) calls impure invariantists “sensitive invariantists” and 
pure invariantists “insensitive invariantists.” DeRose (2009) calls pure in-
variantists “classical invariantists”; Stanley (2005) and MacFarlane (2005) 
call them “strict invariantists;” Reed (forthcoming) calls them “stable in-
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A third debate, as ancient as the previous two are recent, cuts 
across all the positions discussed so far: the debate over skepticism. 
Do we know most, or at least many, of the things we ordinarily take 
ourselves to know? Or to put the matter in a way contextualists 
might find more congenial, do we usually, or at least often, speak 
truthfully when we say people ‘know’ things? Skeptics answer ‘no’, 
nonskeptics  answer  ‘yes’.  These  are  not  perfectly  precise  views, 
since ‘many’, ‘most’,  ‘usually’  and ‘often’ are vague terms. Skepti-
cism comes in degrees.
We could end up with eight different positions, depending on 
how we settle the three debates.6
 Nonskeptical  pure  invariantism  (Williamson  2005,  Turri 
2010a)
 Skeptical pure invariantism (Unger 1975)
 Nonskeptical impure invariantism (Hawthorne 2004, Stan-
ley 2005)
 Skeptical impure invariantism
 Nonskeptical  pure  contextualism  (DeRose  2009,  Cohen 
2005)
 Skeptical pure contextualism
 Nonskeptical impure contextualism (Greco 2010)
 Skeptical impure contextualism
Some of these positions are unoccupied in the current literature and 
will be ignored here. (It’s hard to even imagine any motivation for, 
variantists.”
6 Here I set aside consideration of  assessment relativism about knowledge 
attributions. See MacFarlane 2005.
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say, skeptical impure contextualism or skeptical impure invariant-
ism.) Some important participants are sometimes difficult to clas-
sify.  For  example,  Jeremy Fantl  and  Matt  McGrath are  typically 
classed with  John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley  as  nonskeptical 
impure invariantists, but Fantl and McGrath’s primary allegiance is 
to the less specific position of nonskeptical impurism, and they ex-
press  openness  to  nonskeptical  impure  contextualism  (see  Fantl 
and McGrath 2009: 53; McGrath 2010: §6).
Impurism and contextualism are both “shifty” positions. They 
entail that either the semantic content or truth-value of knowledge 
ascriptions can shift in ways that traditional epistemology  simply 
overlooks. By contrast, pure invariantism is a fully “stable” position. 
It entails that the semantic content and truth-value of knowledge 
ascriptions neither do nor can shift in the ways that impurists and 
contextualists claim that they can and often do.
Pure  invariantism is  orthodoxy.  And since philosophers have 
traditionally been (mostly) nonskeptical, nonskeptical pure invari-
antism has the distinction of being the received view in contempor-
ary  epistemology.  Impurists  and  contextualists  are  philosophical 
rebels. Is their rebellion justified?7
2. The received view contested
Why rebel against the received view? Some argue for skepticism or 
7 An overzealous and irreverent traditionalist might characterize the debate 
as “the embattled  pure hearted fending off the combined strength of the 
imps and cons.” A less colorful but more temperate and dignified charac-
terization of the debate is offered in the main text.
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express  sympathy  for  it  (e.g.  Unger  1975,  Reed  2007,  BonJour 
2010).  But there have always been skeptics and they have always 
been a distinct minority. The leading contemporary challenge to or-
thodoxy is motivated by linguistic intuitions about verbal behavior. 
Many philosophers argue that these intuitions provide strong evid-
ence against pure invariantism. They argue that either impurism or 
contextualism best explains the intuitive linguistic facts.8
Simple  thought  experiments  elicit  the  relevant  intuitions.  In 
particular they are elicited by descriptions of entirely realistic pairs 
of  cases  which  seemingly  reflect  how  competent  speakers  use 
‘know’. One case, call it ‘LOW’, features a protagonist (‘Low Pro’) 
who sincerely utters ‘I know P’ in an ordinary “low-stakes” setting. 
The key intuition here is that Low Pro’s verbal behavior is natural 
and appropriate. The other case, call it ‘HIGH’, features a protagon-
ist  (‘High Pro’)  who sincerely  utters  ‘I  don’t  know P’  in a  “high-
stakes setting.” The key intuition here is that High Pro’s verbal be-
8 Impurists and contextualists have an in-house debate over which view bet-
ter explains the data, once pure invariantism has been eliminated. I won’t 
concern myself with that debate here. The important point for present pur-
poses  is  that  impurists  and  contextualists  agree  that  pure  invariantism 
can’t do the job. (Assessment relativists like John MacFarlane (2005) argue  
that their view is even better than impurism and contextualism.) I should 
note that Stanley (2005), whom I’m lumping in with the generic opponents 
of orthodoxy, has a more nuanced and slightly ambivalent take on the role 
intuitions play in the dialectic. “These intuitions are not intended simply to 
be data for an epistemological theory, as the grammaticality of various sen-
tences may be taken to be data for a syntactic theory. Rather, the role of my 
appeal to our intuitions about these particular cases is to make vivid our 
commitment to the conceptual connection between knowledge and prac-
tical reasoning” (Stanley 2005: 97–98; compare p. 12). Conee (2005: 64) 
also  expresses  some  ambivalences  about  whether  the  data  are  best  de-
scribed as “intuitions” or “intuitive responses” based on something else.
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havior is natural and appropriate. Importantly, the cases are set up 
so that Low Pro and High Pro are in equally strong epistemic posi-
tions with respect to P: they have the same evidence, are equally re-
liable,  are  equally  alert  to  counterevidence,  are  just  as  confident 
that P is true. And they are otherwise similarly situated,  with one 
exception:  in  HIGH  the  stakes  are  considerably  higher  because 
much more rides on whether P is  true.  It  is  perhaps a harmless 
oversimplification to say that the only difference between Low Pro 
and High Pro is that High Pro has more to worry about.9
Consider a concrete pair of such cases.10
LOW FLIGHT: Stewart is in the Atlanta airport, waiting to 
board  his  flight.  A  fellow traveler  seated  nearby  looks  up 
from his laptop, stretches, turns to Stewart and says, “I’ve 
been traveling all day and it’ll be a relief to get home to De-
troit. A layover would be annoying. Say, do you happen to 
know whether this is a direct flight to Detroit?” With his itin-
erary in hand, Stewart answers, “Yes, I do — it’s direct to De-
troit.”
HIGH FLIGHT: Stewart is in the Atlanta airport, waiting to 
board his flight. Suddenly a man dressed in a uniform and 
9 Shaffer (2006) has a very different take on which data best support contex-
tualism,  focusing instead on the “contrast”  and “question sensitivity”  of 
knowledge ascriptions.
10 The pair is inspired by Cohen’s (1999: 58) widely discussed airport case, 
but  whereas Cohen’s  case involves  both elevated stakes  and the explicit 
mention of a specific error possibility, my cases don’t involve the mention 
of specific error possibilities. This will be important below when we con-
sider Patrick Rysiew and Jessica Brown’s defense of pure invariantism. 
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carrying a small hardshell cooler rushes down the concourse, 
stops in front of Stewart’s gate and breathlessly says to Stew-
art, “I’m an organ courier transporting a kidney to a patient 
in Detroit. I need a direct flight to Detroit, or the kidney will 
spoil. Do you know whether this is a direct flight to Detroit?” 
With his itinerary in hand, Stewart answers, “Sorry, I don’t 
know [whether it is]. You should check with an airline offi-
cial.”
In each case,  based on the itinerary Stewart believes throughout 
that the flight is direct to Detroit, and his belief is true.
The cases reflect how we ordinarily speak.11 Speakers are dis-
posed to be more generous in their ‘knowledge’ attributions in LOW 
cases, more sparing in their ‘knowledge’ attributions in HIGH cases, 
and likely to deny ‘knowledge’ in HIGH cases. This is all “utterly 
natural” and “integral to the ordinary use of ‘know’” (Williamson 
2005: 217; compare Stine 1976: 274).
But why should this undermine pure invariantism? How do we 
go  from  the  propriety  and  naturalness  of  such  behavior  to  the 
denial of pure invariantism? According to Timothy Williamson,
11 Or so it seems to theorists reflecting on the matter from the armchair. As 
with other aspects of actual patterns and tendencies in ordinary usage of 
‘know’, the matter is ripe for empirical investigation. As much recent work 
in  experimental  philosophy  and  psychology  has  suggested,  sometimes 
we’re surprised by what we find when  we  carefully  look and see (e.g. see 
Beebe and Buckwalter 2010,  Beebe and Jensen 2012,  Beebe forthcoming, 
Weinberg et  al.  2001,  Swain and Weinberg  2008,  Feltz  and Zarpentine 
2010, Starmans and Friedman 2012, Schaffer and Knobe forthcoming, Sri-
pada  and  Stanley  forthcoming,  Pinillos  forthcoming,  Myers-Schulz  and 
Schwitzgebel  forthcoming,  Murray et  al.  forthcoming,  Turri  2012,  Turri 
2013, Turri under review, and Turri and Friedman forthcoming).
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Presumably,  the  endorsement  rests  on  a  methodological 
principle of charity, by which, very roughly, we should prefer 
to interpret speakers as speaking . . . truly rather than falsely 
(ceteris paribus). Shifting standards seems to give us more 
flexibility to assign to ‘know’ a charitable reference. (Willi-
amson 2005: 220; compare Fantl and McGrath 2009: ch. 2, 
and Davis 2007: 430)12
Keith DeRose’s most recent work (2009: ch. 2) confirms this by cla-
rifying “the methodology that takes us from the data to a contextu-
alist conclusion,” or more generally, from the data to the denial of 
pure invariantism. The data are the “intuitive” facts that the cases 
feature sincere, natural and appropriate speech, along with the ob-
servation that the speech isn’t based on mistaken beliefs about the 
situation. DeRose calls this “the best possible type of evidence” we 
could have against  invariantism in epistemology,  and exactly the 
same  type  of  evidence  that  leads  us  to  reject,  say,  invariantism 
about indexicals or gradable adjectives. DeRose’s key methodolo-
gical claim is that there is a “general presumption” that when com-
petent speakers “are not basing their claims on some false beliefs 
they have about underlying matters of fact, how they naturally and 
appropriately describe a situation, especially by means of common 
words, will be a true description.” Consequently, DeRose concludes, 
it is “a bad strike against” a theory “if it rules [that such descriptions  
are] false, as it seems invariantism will have to rule with respect to 
12 Note that Williamson is characterizing the line of thought, not endorsing it. 
He defends pure invariantism.
11  |  John Turri
one or the other of” High Pro and Low Pro (2009: 50–1, 67).
In short, if we combine (a) the fact that sincere, natural, appro-
priate, non-misinformed descriptive uses of ‘know’ in ordinary lan-
guage are guided by noticeably different standards in different con-
texts, and (b) the charitable methodological principle that such de-
scriptive  uses  are  true,  then  we  have  evidence  that  “militate[s] 
strongly” against pure invariantism.13 Pure invariantism is too in-
flexible  to  charitably  explain  all  the  data.  It  predicts  that  when 
knowledge ascriptions in different contexts superficially contradict 
one another, at least one of them is false. And it predicts that know-
ledge doesn’t come and go depending on how much is at stake. But 
a charitable explanation of our linguistic behavior leads us to reject 
at least one of those predictions. Our linguistic behavior is shifty. 
Pure invariantism can’t shift gears.
To help organize the discussion, I’ll understand the argument 
against  pure  invariantism  as  follows,  where  ‘proper’  abbreviates 
‘sincere, natural, appropriate and not based on misinformation’.
(Anti-PI)
1. Low Pro’s and High Pro’s utterances are proper. (Premise)
2. If their utterances are proper, then both of their utterances 
13 DeRose also reports intuiting directly that the utterances in question are 
true (e.g. 2009: 49 n.2). But he doesn’t simply rest with this. He acknow-
ledges  that  the  intuition  that  a  speaker’s  utterance  is  “appropriate”  is 
stronger than the intuition that it’s true (2009: 50). DeRose then proceeds 
to argue that appropriateness is powerful evidence for the truth, as I de-
scribe in the main text. This is a good approach because it begins with less 
controversial data  — intuitions about the  generic propriety of speech  — 
which all parties to the debate are more likely to agree on.
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are true. (Premise: Charity Principle)14
3. So both of their utterances are true. (From 1 and 2)
4. If both of their utterances are true, then pure invariantism is 
false. (Premise)
5. So pure invariantism is false. (From 3 and 4)
3. The received view defended
How should pure invariantists respond? The argument is valid, so 
they must reject at least one premise. This section reviews several 
previous responses. The next two sections develop a new response.
Here is one strategy for rejecting line 4.15 Knowing P requires 
confidently enough believing P.16 But high stakes induce people to 
be  epistemically  cautious,  perhaps  excessively  so.  We need more 
evidence to maintain the same level of confidence. Recall that High 
Pro and Low Pro have the same evidence. The high stakes erode 
High Pro’s confidence to the point where he no longer knows P. So 
High Pro speaks truthfully when he denies that he knows. But this 
14 Alternatively,  line 2 might have said,  “The best explanation for 1 is that 
both of their utterances are true.” Pure invariantist arguments against line 
2 have indeed focused on finding a satisfying alternative explanation of the 
utterances’ propriety.
15 Inspired by Bach 2010, though I’m not sure Bach would endorse my way of 
putting it. The proposal is modeled on his, but he has a different sort of 
case (a “third-person” case) in mind when he makes his proposal. Compare 
also Hawthorne’s “belief removal model” (2004: 169).
16 It  has  recently  been  disputed  whether  belief  is  genuinely  required  for 
knowledge. For example, Myers-Shulz and Schwitzgebel (forthcoming) and 
Murry et al. (forthcoming) present empirical evidence that, on the ordinary 
conept of knowledge, knowledge doesn’t  require belief.  For an opposing 
view, see Rose and Schaffer forthcoming, and Buckwalter, Rose and Turri 
under review.
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is because he fails to satisfy the invariant requirements of know-
ledge, not because the meaning of ‘knows’ or the requirements of 
knowledge are shifty.
In response, critics deny that High Pro is best understood as 
losing confidence in the relevant sense. At least,  the case doesn’t 
have to be interpreted that way.  There  is  another  way of  under-
standing  it  that  suffices  for  the  critic’s  purpose.  DeRose  (2009: 
190–3) argues  that  this  objection  to  line  4  presupposes  an  “un-
stable” conception of confidence, whereas a “stable” conception is 
“more natural” and “correct.” On the stable conception, high-stakes 
situations don’t typically diminish our confidence. Rather, the same 
level of confidence is present in both LOW and HIGH. This level of 
confidence disposes us to act one way in LOW but more cautiously 
in HIGH.17
Another response is to reject line 2 on the grounds that Low 
Pro’s  utterance  is  false  because  he  fails  to  meet  the  demanding 
standards  of  knowledge.  Low Pro’s  utterance  nevertheless  seems 
proper because it’s close enough to the truth for practical purposes 
(Unger 1975). One way of sharpening this proposal is to invoke the 
phenomenon of loose talk (compare Conee 2005, Davis 2007). It 
would be laborious to always be perfectly precise. It’s convenient to 
speak loosely when present purposes don’t require precision. Some 
contexts tolerate very liberal approximations of the truth  whereas 
others require great precision. Our variable strictness in ascribing 
knowledge follows the same pattern,  one might argue,  which ex-
17 See also Brown 2005: 147–8.
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plains the shiftiness in our use of ‘knows’ while maintaining that the 
truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions are invariant.
The loose-talk strategy faces two challenges. First, it seems too 
hospitable to skepticism. Indeed, Unger deployed it as part of his 
overall case for a radical form of skepticism, to help explain why we 
falsely say that we know many things. As Conee (2005: 52) puts it, 
on this view “only the most conspicuous facts of current perception, 
the clearest memories, triple-checked calculations, and the like will” 
enable knowledge. Other things being equal, I prefer a less skeptical 
defense of pure invariantism.18 Second, knowledge-talk doesn’t fit 
the profile of loose talk (MacFarlane 2005: 784). You say, “I’m go-
ing to the store. Do we have any coffee left?” and I respond, “No, it’s 
all gone.” If you challenge me, “Actually, there are a few grounds 
left  in  the  jar,”  a  natural  comeback  on  my  part  would  be,  “[Of 
course] I meant it was  just about all gone [and so you should buy 
some more].” By contrast, in typical cases where someone is chal-
lenged, “Actually, you don’t know that,” they don’t say, “the point is 
that I  just about know it,” or, “[Of course] I meant that I nearly 
knew it.”
Patrick Rysiew (2001, 2005) rejects line 2 for different reasons. 
His proposal is premised on the uncontroversial observation that an 
utterance communicates more than its literal content. We presup-
pose  that  our  conversational  partners  are  cooperative  and,  con-
18 Compare Stanley’s (2005:  84) remarks on a contextualist  version of the 
loose-talk strategy: “This is not a very satisfying way of ‘rescuing’ ordinary 
knowledge attributions. Indeed, one may wonder whether it has any ad-
vantages over skepticism at all.”
15  |  John Turri
sequently, that they strive to make their speech relevant. This pre-
sumption enables us to communicate information beyond what we 
literally  say,  a phenomenon which I’ll  call  suggestion or  convey-
ance. Knowledge attributions are no exception: they can also sug-
gest  or  convey  information.  On  Rysiew’s  view,  High  Pro  speaks 
properly but falsely when he says that he doesn’t know. High Pro 
says that he doesn’t know in order to avoid suggesting certain other 
false things. And in the context it seems more important to avoid 
the false suggestion than to speak the literal truth. This is why we 
intuit that his utterance, although false, is proper. 
The details  of  Rysiew’s  influential  proposal  are important  so 
let’s consider it more carefully. Knowing P requires being in a good 
enough epistemic  position relative  to  P.  For  convenience Rysiew 
understands being in a  good enough epistemic position as being 
able  to  rule  out  the  relevant  alternatives,  on  some  moderately 
strong but nonskeptical and invariant understanding of ‘relevant al-
ternatives’.19 We’re often able to rule out all the  relevant alternat-
ives but we’re almost never able to rule out all alternatives. Let ‘C’ 
name one of these irrelevant alternatives that, on a specific occa-
sion, you can’t rule out. Despite being irrelevant, C might still be 
conversationally salient (‘salient’ for short). And in a context where 
C is salient, saying ‘I know P’ suggests that you can rule out C. It 
suggests this because C is salient, you’re presumed to be cooperat-
ive, and so it’s expected that you wouldn’t say ‘I know P’ unless you 
19 Rysiew’s approach isn’t wedded to relevant alternatives theory. This will be 
important below.
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(wanted to communicate that you) can rule out C. So in order to 
avoid falsely suggesting that you can rule out C, you say ‘I  don’t 
know P’. And since conversational salience is highly context-sensit-
ive, Rysiew argues, this pragmatic account can explain the shifti-
ness of our knowledge attributions.
Rysiew’s proposal faces a challenge. It’s not generally true that 
when asserting R suggests S, asserting not-R similarly suggests not-
S. For example, if a colleague asks me my opinion of a certain res-
taurant and I respond, “The best I can say about that place is that 
the staff is polite,” this suggests that their food isn’t good. But if I 
instead say, “The best I can say about that place isn’t that the staff is 
polite,” this does  not suggest that their food  is good. To take an-
other example, if my partner asks whether we’ll be on time for the 
reception, and I say, “It’s possible,” this suggests that I am not con-
fident  that  we  will  be  on  time.  But  if  I  instead  say,  “It’s  not 
possible,” this does not suggest that I am confident that we will be 
on time — far from it!
In light of these points, reconsider Rysiew’s proposal. Suppose 
that saying ‘I know P’ suggests that you can rule out all the salient 
alternatives,  even the epistemically irrelevant ones you can’t  rule 
out, such as C. Now when asked whether you know P, one way to 
avoid suggesting that you can rule out C is to not say anything at 
all. But that would be rude. A politer way is to hedge with ‘Maybe I 
know, but C sure is hard to rule out’ or ‘I’m tempted to say “I know,” 
but then again, there is the possibility of C’. Those hedges have the 
advantage of being true. Why opt for the false ‘I don’t know’ when 
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you could avoid suggesting the falsehood by expressing a readily 
available truth? This defies our expectations of competent, cooper-
ative speakers. The upshot is that although Rysiew’s view predicts 
that High Pro won’t say ‘I know P’, it doesn’t explain why he goes so 
far as to say ‘I don’t know P’.20
 But does it really defy our expectations? As Brown (2006: 415 
ff) notes, it’s not uncommon for speakers to say something literally 
false in order to convey a relevant truth. Such speech often seems 
proper, as in the following example. It’s lunchtime. You’re hungry 
and would like some company over a meal. “Have you had lunch?” 
you ask me. “No, I haven’t had lunch,” I respond. Arguably what I 
say is literally false because I have eaten lunch at some time in the 
past; but it conveys a relevant truth, namely, that I haven’t eaten 
lunch  today.  I  could  easily  have  truthfully  said  ‘I  haven’t  eaten 
lunch today’ and had the same effect, yet it still seems appropriate 
for me to prefer the shorter false utterance instead. Presumably it’s 
appropriate  because  you  aren’t  liable  to  be  misled  by  my  literal 
words  into  thinking  that  I  had  somehow,  amazingly,  lived  over 
thirty  years  without  eating  lunch  even  once;  rather,  you  can  be 
counted on to infer that I intended to communicate that I hadn’t 
eaten lunch today. On similar grounds, Rysiew and Brown might 
argue, it’s appropriate for High Pro to prefer ‘I don’t know’ to true 
but less convenient formulations such as ‘Maybe I know, but C sure 
is hard to rule out’.
20 Compare Fantl and McGrath (2009: 41). Why achieve your conversational 
purpose “by lying,” they ask, when it could be achieved “just as well with 
the truth?” See also DeRose (2009: 111–124).
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Brown is clearly right that there is precedent for this sort of ex-
planation. But one worry is that the precedent differs importantly 
from the High cases that it’s invoked to help explain. For example, 
in HIGH FLIGHT the organ courier can’t be counted on to avoid be-
ing misled by Stewart’s literal words. The presumption is that the 
courier will believe Stewart when Stewart says ‘I don’t know’. And 
the courier has no special reason to think that Stewart is merely try-
ing to avoid falsely suggesting that he can rule out a salient but ir-
relevant alternative. So whereas I know that you won’t be misled 
when I say ‘I haven’t eaten lunch’, Stewart doesn’t have any reason 
to think that the organ courier won’t be misled when he says ‘I don’t 
know’.
Rysiew and Brown’s view faces another challenge: some high 
cases lack an irrelevant but salient alternative, which their view re-
quires in order to explain the relevant behavior. The organ courier 
mentions  no  error  possibility  to  Stewart.  No  one  mentions  that 
Stewart’s  itinerary  might  contain  a  misprint,  or  that  the  captain 
might  mistakenly  land the  plane  in  Pittsburgh,  or  anything else. 
LOW FLIGHT and HIGH FLIGHT seem to feature exactly the same 
set of alternatives: it’s a direct flight to Detroit versus it’s not a dir-
ect flight to Detroit. It’s totally implausible to suggest that it’s not a 
direct flight to Detroit is relevant in LOW FLIGHT but irrelevant in 
HIGH FLIGHT. And it’s equally implausible to suggest that it’s not 
a  direct  flight  to  Detroit is  salient  in  HIGH FLIGHT but not  in 
LOW FLIGHT.  Thus  Rysiew and Brown’s  proposal  can’t  explain 
why Stewart says ‘I don’t know’.
19  |  John Turri
Rysiew and Brown might respond that heightened stakes natur-
ally prompt us to start worrying about additional alternatives, even 
if they’re not mentioned. For example, they might say it’s natural 
that in HIGH FLIGHT Stewart’s thoughts will turn to the possibility 
that his itinerary contains a misprint, or the possibility that the pi-
lot will make an unnecessary, unauthorized stop. The problem with 
this response is that it doesn’t seem essential to the case that Stew-
art  begins worrying about such possibilities.  Even if  we stipulate 
that  he’s  cool  under  pressure  and  doesn’t  begin  to  worry  about 
those possibilities, it seems neither unnatural nor inappropriate for 
him to deny that he knows.
At this point it’s worth recalling the generic version of Rysiew’s 
proposal,  stated in terms of  strength of epistemic position  rather 
than relevant alternatives. It’s uncontroversial that knowledge re-
quires a true belief plus a strong enough epistemic position. How 
strong? We’re not giving an analysis of knowledge, so it’s harmless 
to  answer  ‘strong  enough to  know’.  But  strong enough to know 
doesn’t entail strong enough for everything. Some purposes might 
require a position stronger than what knowledge strictly requires. If 
that’s  the  case,  then  we  can  explain  High  Pro’s  behavior  even 
without  a  conversationally  salient  but  epistemically  irrelevant  al-
ternative,  as  follows.  In  both LOW FLIGHT and HIGH FLIGHT 
Stewart’s epistemic position relative to it’s a direct flight to Detroit 
is strong enough to know and strong enough to satisfy a stranger’s 
idle curiosity. But in neither case is it strong enough for directing 
personnel in life-and-death medical matters. So Stewart knows in 
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both cases and Stewart speaks falsely in HIGH FLIGHT when he 
says ‘I don’t know’. Nevertheless, he also speaks appropriately be-
cause  he  communicates  that  his  epistemic  position  isn’t  strong 
enough for the courier’s conversationally salient purposes.
Understood this way, Rysiew and Brown’s view contrasts inter-
estingly with the loose-talk proposal discussed earlier. Just as it was 
argued earlier  that  Low Pro speaks  falsely  but  appropriately  be-
cause present purposes recommend loose usage, here it is argued 
that High Pro speaks falsely but appropriately because present pur-
poses recommend, as it were, guarded usage.
Overall, although Rysiew and Brown’s defense of pure invari-
antism is impressive, it faces difficult challenges. I’ll raise two fur-
ther concerns about their view before presenting my own proposal 
in the next section.
First, it’s noteworthy that competent speakers in High cases re-
spond similarly whether you ask them ‘P?’ or ‘Do you know whether 
P?’  (see Turri 2010b, 2011). Consider this exceedingly minor revi-
sion of HIGH FLIGHT.
Stewart is in the Atlanta airport, waiting to board his flight. 
Suddenly a man dressed in a uniform and carrying a small, 
hardshell cooler comes rushing down the concourse, stops in 
front of Stewart’s gate, and breathlessly says to Stewart, “I’m 
an organ courier transporting a kidney to a patient in De-
troit. I need a direct flight to Detroit, or the kidney will spoil. 
Is this a direct flight to Detroit?” With his itinerary in hand, 
Stewart  answers,  “Sorry,  I  don’t  know.  You  should  check 
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with an airline official.”
The only difference here is that the courier asks Stewart ‘Is this a 
direct flight to Detroit?’ instead of ‘Do you know whether this is a 
direct  flight  to  Detroit?’.  The  very  same  answer,  ‘I  don’t  know’, 
serves equally well and seems to have the same effect on the conver-
sation in both versions of the case. It might be too much to ask for 
an identical explanation of both versions, but we should expect the 
explanation to be similar for both.  It’s  not clear that Rysiew and 
Brown’s view can offer this.
Second,  Rysiew says  that  it’s  “essential”  to  his  proposal  that 
“our untutored intuitions about the truth conditions of various sen-
tences are generally insensitive to the semantic/pragmatic distinc-
tion” (2007: 648; cf. 660 n. 31). That is, our intuitive estimation of 
speech as true or false doesn’t distinguish between the truth value 
of what we literally say, on the one hand, from the truth value of 
what we suggest,  on the other.  Instead we “tend to identify” the 
truth value of an utterance with the truth of “the most salient pro-
position  a  speaker  actually  communicates”  in  saying  it  (Rysiew 
2001:  487).  Moreover,  Rysiew extends this  point  to  explain  why 
some mistakingly believe that they don’t know certain things, as fol-
lows (2001: 502–3). Saying ‘I know that I’m not a brain in a vat’  
would falsely suggest that I can rule out the irrelevant possibility 
that I am a brain in a vat.21 As a result, I not only refrain from say-
ing ‘I know I’m not a brain in a vat’, but I also mistakenly “come to 
21 This possibility is irrelevant, on Rysiew’s view, because nobody accepts it 
(2001: 499).
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believe” that I don’t know that I’m not a brain in a vat.
Suppose that  attributing  such confusion  to  us  is  essential  to 
Rysiew’s view.22 Then one might question whether the antiskeptical 
preference that Rysiew and I share is properly motivated. Moore 
(1959: 193 ff)  pitted the obviousness of commonsense knowledge 
attributions against the skeptic’s wherewithal. And many nonskep-
tical  epistemologists  follow him in that regard.  But if  it’s  correct 
that  we  begin  doing  epistemology  with  long  habits  of  mistaking 
false  knowledge  ascriptions  for  true  ones,  and  true  knowledge 
ascriptions for false ones,  then that poisons the well  of Moorean 
data, thereby weakening Moore’s hand — perhaps even to the point 
where he no longer knows that he has one.
The  objections  and concerns  I’ve  raised  might  not  debilitate 
Rysiew and Brown’s view. I don’t claim that they are insurmount-
able. But they are enough to motivate me to look for an alternative 
response to Anti-PI. Of course, alternative responses needn’t com-
pete with one another. They could be complementary.
4. Indirect speech acts
The  responses  to  line  2  covered  in  the  last  section  are  widely 
labeled, in Keith DeRose’s memorable phrase, “warranted assertab-
ility maneuvers” or “WAMs” for short (DeRose 1999: 196 ff; 2009: 
83 ff). Brown helpfully encapsulates the essence of a WAM.
22 I’m not convinced that Rysiew is right when he says that this is essential to 
his view, but set that aside.
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At the core of a WAM is the idea that the intuitions about 
contextualist cases [e.g. High/Low pairs] can be explained by 
appeal to the truth-value of the propositions pragmatically 
conveyed by knowledge attributions, rather than the literal 
truth-value of those attributions. (Brown 2005: 150)
A  WAM is  one  way  to  develop a  pragmatic  account  of  such 
cases. But it isn’t the only way. In the remainder of this section, I’ll 
lay  the  groundwork  for  a  pragmatic  account  that  doesn’t  fit  the 
WAM model, based on speech-act theory.23
Orders and requests are ways to direct people. More specific-
ally,  they  are  speech  acts  we  perform in  order  to  direct  people. 
Sometimes we direct  them overtly by saying things like ‘pass the 
salt’ or ‘give me the information’. We could even use an explicit per-
formative, as in ‘I request that you pass the salt’ and ‘I hereby com-
mand you to give me the information’. But explicit performatives 
are awkward and overt direction is impolite, so we usually make re-
quests indirectly. Often we do this by asking questions, as with ‘can 
you pass the salt?’, ‘could you give me the information?’, ‘would you 
mind not stepping on my foot?’, and ‘do you want to join us for din-
ner?’. Another way to make an indirect request is by stating that we 
have certain preferences, as with ‘I would like (you to pass me) the 
salt’, ‘I hope you’re able to give me the information’, and ‘I need you 
to get off my foot’.
That these are all ways of indirectly requesting is supported by 
23 The remainder of this section is heavily indebted to John Searle’s (1979: ch. 
2) discussion of indirect speech acts.
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the fact that we can felicitously add ‘please’ to what we say, as in 
‘please, can you pass the salt?’ and ‘would you please give me the in-
formation?’. It is also supported by the fact that we naturally re-
spond to the questions as if they were requests. We  hear them as 
requests. If at the dinner table you ask, “Can you pass the salt?” I 
pass you the salt without further ado, just as I would if you directly 
requested it in the imperative mood. Similarly, if you ask, “Can you 
pass the salt?” and I respond, “No,” you don’t suddenly start worry-
ing that my arms are paralyzed or that I’m lying to you. You under-
stand me to be denying your request, not answering the question it-
self.
Making a request is your primary purpose in asking, “Can you 
pass the salt?” That you’re also asking a question is incidental. It’s 
mutual knowledge that we both already know that I can pass the 
salt,  so you’re neither seeking information nor trying to lead me 
down a path of self-discovery. Moreover, if I responded directly to 
your literal question by saying, “Yes, I am indeed able to do that,” 
or, “Why do you want to know?” it would be interpreted as either 
humorous (if said while passing the salt) or uncooperative (if said 
despite not passing the salt).
Call the performance of an indirect speech act  indirection. We 
can distinguish different types of indirection. Conventional indirec-
tion is accomplished by using idioms, which usage has established 
as indirectional devices. Examples of conventional indirection are 
‘how about passing me the salt?’ as a way of requesting the salt, or 
‘I’ll  be  keeping  an  eye  on  you’  as  a  way  of  warning  or  putting 
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someone on notice.
Conversational indirection is accomplished by exploiting fea-
tures specific to the conversational context, along with general com-
municative principles and background knowledge.  Here is an ex-
ample:
Man: Let’s go to the movies tonight.
Woman: I have a lot to prepare for a major court case sched-
uled early tomorrow morning.
The man makes a direct proposal. Normally the woman’s response 
would count as a denial of the proposal. But that’s not because ‘I 
have a lot to prepare for a major court case scheduled early tomor-
row morning’ is conventionally associated with denying proposals. 
Rather, it’s because, in the context, it’s clear that the best way to 
make sense of her assertion is that she wants to communicate that 
she will not be going to the movies tonight with him. To accept the 
proposal, all she had to say was ‘sure’, but instead she chose to as-
sert that she had a time-consuming task to complete, which would 
usually prevent her from having enough time to go to the movies. 
She wouldn’t have said that unless she was politely declining the 
proposal.
Not all cases of indirection fall neatly into either conventional 
or conversational. Many seem to fall somewhere in between. Ques-
tions involving ‘can’, ‘would’ and ‘could’ are unlike idioms, in that 
they retain a literal compositional meaning, they admit of direct re-
sponses  to  their  literal  content,  and  their  literal  translation  into 
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other languages can preserve their indirectional potential.24 Yet they 
are also unlike ‘I have to prepare for a major court case’,  in that 
their default status is to be  heard as requests. Stage-setting is re-
quired to hear ‘can you pass the salt?’ primarily as a question about 
your abilities rather than as a request to pass the salt. By contrast, 
stage-setting is required to hear ‘I have to prepare for a major court 
case’ primarily as a denial rather than an assertion.
Closely related to the point about how readily we hear certain 
formulations as indirect requests, conventional and conversational 
indirection also differ in whether asking for clarification is felicit-
ous. It would be positively odd for a competent speaker to ask for 
clarification upon being asked, “How about passing me the salt?” 
Sincerely asking in turn, “Just to clarify, are you asking me to pass 
you the salt?” would come across as completely obtuse. By contrast, 
in cases of conversational indirection, asking for clarification is typ-
ically felicitous. In the example above, it would not be out of order 
for the man to follow up with, “So is that a ‘no’?” or, “We’re not go-
ing, then, right?” On this dimension, typical indirect requests fea-
turing  ‘can’,  ‘would’  and  the  like  behave  more  like  conventional 
than  conversational  indirection.  Normally  if  you  ask,  “Can  you 
change the channel?” and I sincerely ask in turn, “Are you asking 
me to change the channel?” you’re likely to think me annoyingly 
dimwitted.
(If we want a label for the in-between cases of indirection in-
24 Compare to paradigm cases of idioms, such as ‘they tied the knot’, ‘keep an 
eye out’, and ‘how about the weather lately?’.
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volving ‘can’, ‘would’ and the like, let’s call them convensational in-
direction.)
We can deny indirect requests either directly or indirectly. Re-
sponding with a simple ‘no’ is blunt and potentially impolite, but 
still in order. Answering ‘no’ is heard not as a commentary on the 
speaker’s abilities — i.e. not as answering the literal question — but 
as a denial of the request. It’s natural to add ‘sorry’, which makes it  
more polite, though still direct. And if a request is answered with a 
‘no’,  earnestly  replying in turn, “That’s just not true  — you’re an 
able-bodied adult fully capable of passing the salt,” or, “That’s a lie 
and you know it!” will come across as either incoherent (if the ori-
ginal request was made directly in the imperative), or coherent but 
obtuse (if the original request was made indirectly in the interrogat-
ive).
A very common way of indirectly denying an indirect request is 
to echo the verb of the literal original question and add a negation. 
If you ask, “Can you give me the information?”, then my response, 
“I  can’t,” is  felicitous.  If  you ask, “Do you want to help me with 
this?”, then my response, “I don’t,” is similarly felicitous. It is also 
felicitous to echo the entire original question, and add ‘no’, ‘sorry’,  
and other  respectful  niceties,  as  in  ‘I  am sorry,  but  no,  unfortu-
nately I can’t give the information to you’, and ‘It hurts me to say so, 
but no, I don’t want to help you with this.’ Taken literally, and set-
ting aside the niceties, these indirect denials are literal assertions 
about the speaker’s inability to do something or about the believer’s 
mental  state.  But  they  are  heard  primarily  as  denials.  Earnestly 
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replying in turn, “That’s just not true. You’re able to give me the in-
formation — it’s right there in your hand, and all you have to do is 
hand it to me,” would come across as coherent but obtuse and could 
be met with, “You’re right, I am able to. I’m just not going to.”
5. WAM! BAM! POW!
It’s time to relate our discussion of indirection back to the argument 
against pure invariantism, Anti-PI. The ultimate goal is to defend 
pure  invariantism  without  courting  skepticism.  The  strategy  for 
achieving this goal is to deny line 2, on the grounds that High Pro 
speaks properly but falsely when he says ‘I don’t know’. The pro-
posed  tactic  for  implementing  this  strategy  is  to  appeal  to  High 
Pro’s primary illocutionary intention in uttering those words,  and 
thereby  drive a wedge between our intuition that he speaks prop-
erly, on the one hand, and the further claim that he speaks truth-
fully,  on  the  other.  High  Pro’s  primary  illocution  is  warranted, 
which is why his speech is proper.
Because I’m appealing to  primary illocutionary  warrant  — or 
what  we might  call  primary  oratorical  warrant  — and because  I 
want  to  emphasize  how my proposal  both  resembles  and differs 
from WAMs, I hereby name my proposal a POW.
POWs and WAMs are alike because they both appeal to a basic 
form of assessment that comes naturally to us when we’re interpret-
ing speech, but is clearly distinct from the assessment of the truth 
value  of  the  literal  propositional  content  of  the  speaker’s  direct 
29  |  John Turri
speech act, which, it so happens, is an assertion in all the key cases 
in  the  literature  (whence  the  title  ‘warranted  assertability man-
euver’). Call any device that fits this mold a basic assessment man-
euver, or a BAM. POWs and WAMs are species of the BAM genus. 
They distinguish themselves by appealing to different forms of basic 
assessment. A WAM explains intuitions by appealing to the truth 
value of propositions pragmatically conveyed by knowledge ascrip-
tions, rather than the literal truth value of the knowledge ascrip-
tions themselves. By contrast, a POW explains the intuitions by ap-
pealing  to  the  aptness  of  the  indirect  speech  acts  performed  by 
speakers making knowledge ascriptions, rather than the literal truth 
value  of  those  ascriptions.  Indirect  speech  acts  aren’t  limited  to 
speech  acts  with  truth-evaluable,  assertive  propositional  content. 
WAMs generate their plausibility from the fact that pragmatically 
conveyed propositions attract our attention and figure centrally in 
our evaluation of speech. POWs generate their plausibility from the 
fact that primary illocutionary intentions attract our attention and 
loom large in our evaluation of speech.
The POW I propose focuses on High Pro’s primary illocutionary 
intention to deny his interlocutor’s request.
Normally the point of asking someone ‘Do you know whether 
P?’ is not to better understand their epistemic standing regarding P. 
Rather,  the questioner’s  primary illocutionary intention is  to  get 
told whether P. Asking ‘Do you know whether P?’ is a way of indir-
ectly asking ‘P?’. (The same applies to other know-wh questions fea-
turing when/how/why/where/what, as well as formulations substi-
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tuting ‘if’  for  ‘whether’.)  As evidence of  this,  notice that  ‘Do you 
know whether P?’ is  heard as asking whether P, we respond to it 
precisely that way, and we expect people to respond to it that way. If 
you ask, “Do you know whether the game is tonight?,” a response of 
‘I do know’ could be interpreted as either playful or humorous, but 
is otherwise interpreted as uncooperative. And again, the same is 
true for other know-wh questions. If you ask, “Do you know when 
the flight boards?”, a simple ‘Yes I do’ is uncooperative. Stage-set-
ting is required for us to hear ‘Do you know whether P?’ primarily 
as  posing the question it  literally  asks.  Its default  status is to be 
heard as the question ‘P?’. (The same applies to ‘Can/could/would 
you tell me whether P?’, ‘Might you know whether P?’, ‘If you don’t 
mind, I’d appreciate it if you could tell me whether P’, etc.)
  To  ask  someone ‘P?’  is  to  request  information.  Usually  we 
don’t seek information just for the sake of it. Often we seek it be-
cause we’re going to rely on it in planning or evaluating courses of 
action.
Now  let’s  return  to  HIGH  FLIGHT.  When  the  courier  asks 
Stewart, “Do you know whether this is a direct flight to Detroit?”, 
he’s requesting Stewart to provide information that will be relied on 
in making a serious decision. Making this request is the courier’s 
primary  illocutionary intention.  It  should be  obvious  that  this  is 
what the courier is doing. To confirm this observation, notice that 
the courier’s prompt exactly fits the model of indirect requests. And 
it would have been natural for the courier to frame his final sen-
tence in any of these ways:
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 Can you tell me whether P?
 Could you tell me whether P?
 Would you tell me whether P?
 Might you know whether P?
 If  you  don’t  mind,  I’d  appreciate  it  if  you  could  tell  me 
whether P.
 It would be very helpful if you could tell me whether P.
Adding ‘please’ would also be perfectly natural and appropriate.
It’s highly unusual for ordinary passengers such as Stewart to 
be asked to be relied on for information relating explicitly to such 
decisions.  Thus it’s  perfectly  understandable  and appropriate  for 
Stewart to not want to grant the courier’s request. Moreover, it’s not 
obviously in Stewart’s self-interest to grant the request and under-
take responsibility, and he’s not morally required to do so either, 
because there are people nearby whose job it is to provide that in-
formation. So Stewart is warranted in denying the request. And that 
is exactly what Stewart does, through indirection. By saying ‘I don’t 
know’, Stewart  indirectly denies the courier’s indirect  request,  in 
the typical way: he echoes the courier’s question and adds a nega-
tion. The courier says ‘Do you know . . . ?’ and Stewart replies with ‘I  
don’t know’.25 By contrast, had Stewart replied with ‘Yes, I do — it’s 
a direct flight’, he would have thereby accepted the courier’s request 
and encouraged the courier to rely on him, thereby undertaking re-
sponsibility.
25 Stewart might also be encouraging the courier to find another source of in-
formation on the  matter.  It’s  natural,  though not  required,  to  interpret 
Stewart that way.
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As evidence that Stewart is indirectly denying a request, notice 
how Stewart’s response exactly fits the profile of indirect denial. I 
already noted the echoic formulation. It would be perfectly natural 




 No, sorry, I don’t.
 No, I’m sorry, I wish I could help, but unfortunately I don’t 
know.
 I’m sorry, I’d like to help, but I’m not the person to ask about 
that.
It would also be odd for the courier to respond directly to the literal 
content of Stewart’s assertion. If Stewart says, “No, sorry, I don’t 
know,” it would not be in order for the courier to respond, “Do you 
have any evidence for that assertion?” or, “I doubt that that’s true.” 
The natural response is more like, “Okay, thanks.”
When evaluating Stewart’s speech, our immediate response is 
not to think that he said something false. This is because our evalu-
ation tracks, in the first instance, the fact that his primary illocu-
tionary intention is warranted (i.e. it tracks primary oratorical war-
rant). Stewart’s point is to deny the request, and denials are neither 
true nor false. That Stewart denies the request by making an asser-
tion is incidental and typically ignored, just as it is incidental and 
typically  ignored  when we indirectly  deny  a  request  by  saying ‘I 
can’t’.
33  |  John Turri
The proposal thus far has granted that Stewart denies the re-
quest by literally asserting that he doesn’t know. This strikes me as 
the most plausible account of the situation. But it’s worth noting 
that there is a more radical proposal in the neighborhood, namely, 
that ‘I don’t know’ functions idiomatically as a way of denying a re-
quest  for  information,  which complements  the  fact  that  ‘Do you 
know’ functions idiomatically as a way of requesting information. 
On this alternative POW, the only speech act Stewart performs is a 
direct denial,  by uttering an idiomatic expression. And whereas I 
have proposed that Stewart incidentally makes a false assertion that 
we ignore, the more radical POW denies that there even is an asser-
tion to be ignored.
This brings me to the essential point in response to line 2 of 
the argument. Even if High Pro speaks literally falsely under such 
circumstances, we should expect  this to be ignored and we should 
expect his speech to both be and seem proper.
The present proposal seems perfectly fitted to explain the asym-
metry in verbal behavior in Low versus High cases. As stakes rise, 
people tend to become more unwilling to be relied upon and under-
take responsibility for information crucial to decision making. And 
this  tendency  is  not  unreasonable,  even  when  holding  constant 
their confidence and the strength of their epistemic position.
This POW avoids problems faced by Rysiew and Brown’s WAM. 
First,  it  doesn’t  court  methodological  danger  from  the  skeptic’s 
corner. It isn’t part of my proposal that we mistakenly judge that a 
Linguistic intuitions in context |  34
false knowledge ascription26 is true because it conveys true informa-
tion. Rather, we simply ignore the false ascription because it is in-
cidental and unimportant. Second, and relatedly, this POW doesn’t 
leave us wondering why Stewart chose to say something false. Stew-
art’s utterance follows the typical format of indirect denials. Third, 
it helps explain why people in HIGH cases respond similarly to both 
‘Do you know whether P?’ and ‘P?’. They respond similarly because 
‘Do you know whether P?’ is simply heard as an indirect request to 
answer ‘P?’. Moreover, this POW does all this without interpreting 
High Pro’s speech as being based on misinformation, and without 
claiming that High Pro’s confidence diminishes.
6. Conclusion
Austin (1956/7: 11 n. 5) once wrote that when we’re investigating 
why we use certain words in certain situations, and why certain lin-
guistic behavior is appropriate, we should “forget, for once and for a 
while, that other curious question ‘Is it true?’.” It’s not clear how 
consistently Austin thinks we ought to avoid asking ‘Is it true?’, but 
avoiding it altogether is certainly unwise. After all, truth often mat-
ters, even if it’s almost never the only thing that matters. If our dis-
cussion here is any indication, we can glean some guidance on when 
it would be wise to look beyond the question of truth, at least for a 
while, namely, when the speakers themselves aren’t primarily con-
26 I say knowledge “ascription” even though it’s literally a knowledge denial 
(i.e. an assertion that knowledge is not present), because I want to avoid 
confusion between this sort of denial, on the one hand, and denying a re-
quest, on the other.
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cerned with performing a truth-evaluable speech act.  When their 
primary illocutionary intention is, for example, to give an order or 
deny  a  request,  the  explanation  of  our  reaction  to  their  speech 
shouldn’t be expected to track the truth of what they literally say. 
In such a case, it’s a distinct possibility that the truth value of their 
literal speech will be irrelevant not only to their own take on the 
situation, but also to our intuitive assessment of their behavior as 
well.27
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